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Happiness and Financial Satisfaction in Israel: 
Effects of Religiosity, Ethnicity, and War 
 
We analyze individual satisfaction with life as a whole and satisfaction with the personal 
financial situation for Israeli citizens of Jewish and Arab descent. Our data set is the Israeli 
Social Survey (2006). We are especially interested in the impact of the religions Judaism, 
Islam and Christianity, where we are able to differentiate between individuals who vary in 
religiosity between secular and ultra-orthodox. We find a significant effect of religiosity on 
happiness. With respect to Jewish families it is most striking that the impact of family size on 
both life and financial satisfaction seems to vary with religiosity. This might be a reason for 
differentiation in family equivalence scales. For Arab families we did not find this effect. First-
generation immigrants are less happy than second-generation immigrants, while there is no 
significant difference between second-generation families and native families. The effect of 
the Lebanon War is much less than expected. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since some decades happiness
1 has become a subject of research for economists. The basis of this 
literature is the happiness or life satisfaction question in which individuals are asked to report their 
satisfaction with life on a bounded scale. The question is:   
"On the whole, how satisfied are you with the life you are leading?" 
The answer to this question, which in Israel's Social Survey ranges from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 4 
(very satisfied), has been termed the individual’s life satisfaction or happiness. An alternative for this 
question is to ask respondents to evaluate their life on a numerical scale, e.g. between 1 and 7 or 0 
and 10, instead of in verbal categories. Similar questions are posed with respect to specific aspects of 
life, or so-called life domains, like job satisfaction, satisfaction with respect to the respondent’s 
financial situation, housing conditions, etc.  
The responses to these questions appear to be correlated with personal characteristics of the 
respondents, such as age, income, past events, and their social and physical environment. We refer 
for surveys on this fast expanding literature to Frey and Stutzer (2002a,b), Senik (2005), Clark, 
Frijters, Shields (2008), Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008), and Dolan, Peasgood, and 
White (2008). It is outside the scope of this article to give an in-depth review of the literature which 
is expanding at an exponential rate. 
In this paper we are especially focusing on the simultaneous effects of religiosity, the impact of a 
war situation and the effect of the migrant status both on life satisfaction and on financial 
satisfaction. The latter concept comes close to the utility of income concept, while the former refers 
to life as whole, and may be seen as the wider concept of  well-being or happiness. The effects will 
be different, and given the smaller and more homogeneous domain, the effects on financial 
satisfaction will be probably more  pronounced than for life satisfaction. 
The Israeli population is one of the few populations where the simultaneous effects of religiosity, the 
impact of a war situation and the effect of the migrant status can be observed and studied on the 
basis of reliable data sets. It has a mix of several religions, it lives under a war threat which is 
sometimes becoming reality, and a sizeable part of the population was not born in the country. 
Clearly there are many other countries living in comparable circumstances, but not under the 
                                                 
1 In line with the happiness economics literature we use the words subjective well –being, happiness, and satisfaction as 
interchangeable.   4
fortunate circumstance that there is a steady statistical data collection, comparable to the elaborate 
statistical administrations in Western countries that live under more stable conditions. 
In Israel the three monotheistic religions are co-existing side by side, first Judaism—the religion of 
the Jewish majority, and second and third Islam and Christianity—the religions of the Arab minority. 
There is a small minority of Druzes. Moreover, within the two sub-populations we find a wide 
spectrum of religiosity, from secular through traditional and orthodox to ultra-orthodox. A sizeable 
part of this colorful ethno-religious mosaic consists of immigrants from all corners of the world, who 
make up for roughly 30% of the Jewish population.  
Within the Jewish population there are three major ethnic subgroups, viz., the Jews of Ashkenazi 
descent (coming from European and American countries), Sephardi Jews (coming from North-
African and Middle-Eastern countries), and the immigrants from the former USSR. Some families 
are in Israel since time immemorial, most are second-generation, and others have just recently 
arrived. Finally, Israel is a country where people live under a continuous threat of terrorism and 
warfare.  
Apart from looking at the usual happiness determinants we will look at some additional factors, viz., 
religiosity, immigration, ethnicity, and the effects of war. In the literature there are many studies on 
the impact of religiosity on happiness, but most of those studies are found in the psychological and 
sociological journals (see Cohen (2002), Clark and Lelkes, (2005), (2009), Helliwell, (2003), 
Dehejia, DeLeire, and Luttmer, (2007), Heady et al. (2010), Snoep (2008)). The main result of these 
studies is that religiously more active persons (mostly defined in terms of church attendance) tend to 
be happier. These results mostly refer to Christian religions, while our study focuses mainly on Islam 
and Judaism, two religions that can deeply impregnate the believer’s life style. Clearly, within the 
two religions we find a lot of gradations, ranging from ultra-orthodoxy to atheists all but in name, 
but it is obvious that especially for the more conservative members Islam and Judaism stand for a 
complex of lifestyles, ethics, and norms that deal with important issues such as one’s clothing, food, 
time usage, obligations with respect to the family, and procreation. In our data set we have 
information regarding the degree of religiosity in terms of being more secular, conservative, or ultra-
orthodox. 
Although it is mostly found that religious people are happier, Snoep (2008), for instance, finds 
evidence for the opposite. On the one hand, being religious and belonging to a religious group may 
provide a feeling of protection and safety for the individual. The religious individual mostly has a   5
comprehensive vision of purpose in life, and a sense of security derived from belonging to a 
community, etc. On the other hand, the fact that during the 20th century the population share of 
religiously active citizens sharply declined in Western countries, seems to imply that many people 
do not see adherence to a religion as an ultimate means of achieving happiness. This observation 
would suggest a negative correlation between religiosity and life-satisfaction. The direction of the 
causality is unclear as well.  
A specific issue is the role of children and family. Is their significance different for religious people 
than for non-religious people? Given the significance of having offspring preached by both orthodox 
Judaism and Islam, we expect that having children has a more positive impact on the well-being of 
believers than on that of non-believers. We will see that for the Jewish population this is indeed the 
case. The impact of having children on financial satisfaction may be considered likewise. It is well-
known that having children has a negative effect on financial satisfaction, which is easily explained 
by the additional cost of children (see e.g. Van Praag and Warnaar, (1993)). If having children is 
positively evaluated by religious persons, we may ask whether this also will be reflected in the 
impact of children on their financial satisfaction.  
With respect to the impact of a war situation we would expect that individual life satisfaction will 
depend on the personal risk if one is living in a zone of warfare, on the national mood before and 
during the war, and, ultimately, on the war outcome. Moreover, it is plausible to expect differences 
in the effect of this war on life - satisfaction between Jews and Arabs.  
One of the few papers on migration and happiness in the happiness economics literature is the paper 
by Easterlin and Plagnol (2008), which deals with the specific case of the re-unification of Germany, 
which is however hardly representative for migration between two different cultures. On one hand 
we expect that immigrants will be happy, as they compare their present situation with the past 
situation in their homeland. On the other hand we expect they are less happy than their new 
compatriots, as they struggle with adaptation problems of all sorts. The relationship between 
migration and mental health, which is sometimes analyzed as the reverse of happiness, has been 
studied as well. Most of the literature concludes that migration has a negative impact on important 
mental health problems, although the relation is uncertain when a broader range of mental health 
(e.g. depression) is included. In a recent study Stillman, McKenzie, and Gibson (2009) for the first 
time estimate the causal effect of migration on mental health by using information on a lottery 
system that randomly chooses from all the applicants the ones that are allowed to migrate from   6
Tonga to New Zeeland. These authors use a measure of mental health that strongly relates to 
psychological well-being and thus to happiness. They conclude that migration to New Zealand 
improves the mental health of Tongan immigrants and that the effect is larger for women and for 
those with lower levels of mental health before migration.  
In this study we differentiate between first- and second- generation immigrants. We differentiate 
with respect to origin as well. Moreover, we use for first-generation immigrants information on 
when they entered the country. We control for fluency in Hebrew that has been shown (e.g., 
Chiswick (1998), Berman et al. (2003)) to be instrumental for a successful integration into the   
Israeli labor market. 
The effect of terrorism on happiness has been studied by Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer (2007, 2009) 
and Romanov, Zussman and Zussman (2010). Frey et al. (2009) use the life satisfaction approach to 
assess the costs of terrorism in France, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland; Frey et al.  
(2007) analyze the Northern Ireland case, while Romanov et al. (2010) study the effect of the 
‘intifada’ (that took place in 2001-2004) on happiness of  Israelis. Evidently, there are all kinds of 
terrorism. During the period studied by us (year 2006) there was one major event, the Second 
Lebanon War, which was particularly threatening for the northern region of the country. The 
difference between the ‘intifada’ and the Lebanon war is that in the first instance the trouble was 
caused by sporadic terror attacks carried out by Palestinians across Israel over the period of four 
years, while in the case of the Lebanon war it was a cross-border clash between the state of Israel 
and a rather well-organized foreign Hezbollah army that bombarded Northern Israel intensively 
during 34 days. In our empirical analysis we focus on the possible effect of the Lebanon war and 
ignore other minor incidents. Since the interviews have been dated per day, we can follow the 
immediate impact of such a short war and its evolution over time. However, as the chances of the 
war vary from day to day the war effect on happiness varies also from day to day. It is not 
monotonic with the number of days elapsed. Ideally, we should have as explanatory variable a daily 
‘war success’ or, adversely, ‘war damage’ index, which we do not have at our disposal. In this paper, 
and following up on Romanov et al. (2010), we study the impact of the Lebanon war on satisfaction 
with ‘life as a whole’ and on financial satisfaction, i.e., satisfaction with one’s economic situation in 
Israel.  
   
2. Empirical strategy.   7
 
There are various ways to estimate the effects we look for. The usual way in order to disentangle the 
various effects is to use Ordered Probit or OLS. Let the response categories to the satisfaction 
question be denoted by j =1,…J and let the explanatory variables be denoted by the vector 
. The response by individual n  is denoted by  ( 1    ,,M XX X =… ) n j . Then the model may be written 
as  
 
  11 ... nn M M n o Sx x n β ββ =+ + + + ε
2
 (2.1) 
where   stands for the satisfaction value assigned to category jn  and where  ε is the usual error 
term.  The equation is frequently  estimated by simple OLS (see, for example, Luttmer (2005)), that 
is,  = jn . The main question, which can be answered after estimation, is what are the ‘trade-off’-
ratios between variables. That is, finding an answer to the question by how much we should vary x2 
in order to compensate for a change in x1. The answer is found by solving the equation β1Δx1+ 
β2Δx2=0 , yielding the trade-off-ratio 
n S
n S
1 / β β . If we attach no cardinal meaning to the response j, we 
may use other estimation methods than OLS as well, such as Ordered Probit or Logit analysis. As 
shown by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) in practice the trade-off-ratios β1/β2 do not change 
much. In other words, the results with respect to trade-offs are approximately method – independent 
(see also Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008)). In this paper we use the so-called POLS-
operationalization (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008) and Luechinger (2009)). This 
method is inspired by the observation that if we use the responses 1,2,3,4 in (2.1) as the variable to 
be explained, the left-hand term is bounded, while the right-hand side may attain any value on the 
real axis. The POLS-operationalization solves this logical flaw, while retaining the handy OLS- 
estimation method. We refer to Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008) for a detailed 
description of the method, which we briefly describe here. We define for each response category j its 
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where we set the variable to be explained equal to its conditional expectation (see e.g. Maddala, 
1983), and , where  n j  stands for the response of individual n, and N(.) and n(.) stand for the standard 
normal distribution and density function respectively. This transformation maps rare extreme events 
into large tail values of the normal distribution. 
We assume that the explanatory variables for life satisfaction and financial satisfaction are the same, 
although of course with different values of the effects. The choice of the variables is partly standard, 
except for some variables, especially relevant for the subject of this study, which are specific for the 
Israeli context and this sample. It should be noticed that financial satisfaction has been rarely 
investigated in the happiness economics literature, except in the older studies of the Leiden School 
(see e.g. Van Praag, (1985) for a survey of old results). 
As standard in the literature, we include ln (gross household income), both ln (age) and its square, 
education dummies, dummies for family status, and employment status. In most literature the age 
variables measured in years are added, but given a general Weber-Fechner Law, we prefer the log–
version. The phenomenon that well-being is parabolic in age or log-age with a minimum at about the 
age of 40 has been described by Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) and earlier for financial 
satisfaction by Plug and Van Praag (1995). In Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) this 
phenomenon was shown to hold not only for life satisfaction but for almost all domain satisfactions 
with the exception of health. We also include family size. Intuition suggests that having to support 
more children implies less financial satisfaction
2. Whether this effect holds for life satisfaction 
remains to be seen. 
Apart from the usual variables we also experiment with a variable indicating the individual self- 
reported health status. This variable HEALTH is operationalized in the regressions by the POLS-
device as well (see Table 1b). The advantage of using the POLS- approach for ordinal categorically 
defined  explanatory variables is that we do not need to include four or three dummy variables, 
corresponding to each separate health level. However, we are a bit prudent, because subjective 
                                                 
2 We assume here that children are not used to a considerable extent  in family firms, or household production, or have to 
contribute their earnings to the household income.   9
Health Satisfaction and Life Satisfaction might be correlated via omitted variables within the error 
terms, yielding an endogeneity bias
3. Therefore, we present the estimation results both with and 
without the health-variable. Comparing coefficients between the two estimation models we do not 
believe that the bias mentioned is present to a significant extent, and health proves to have a 
considerable explanatory value  per se. Another problem with ‘Health’ is of course that it is strongly 
age–related and as a consequence it may weaken the effects of age and of family size, which are 
age–related as well. For our data set this appears to pose no serious problem either. 
 
Religion and religiosity 
 
The special features of this paper are religion, immigrant status and war threat. We distinguish 
between Jews, Muslims, Christians, Druze and other religions. Not surprisingly, this Israeli sample 
contains a majority of Jews but also a fair number of Arab Muslims and Arab Christians. All 
respondents were not only asked for their religion (including being atheist) but also about the 
intensity of their religious feelings. For Jews this was done on a five-degree scale, ranging from 
secular to ultra-orthodox, while for Arabs the same question was asked on a four-degree scale, from 
secular to very religious
4. In order to take account of the differences in religiosity we apply again a 
POLS–transformation which leads to the values as given in Table 1a. Again, the advantage of using 
the POLS-approach is that we do not need to include four or three dummy variables for Jews/Arabs 
in the regression, but that instead we can summarize religiosity by one variable.  The result is the 
variable RELIGIOSITY.  
 
HERE TABLE 1 
 
Additionally to the general variable RELIGIOSITY, we include for the Arab sub-sample dummy 
variables for Christian Arabs and Druze, while Muslim Arabs are the control group.  
Both in Judaism and Islam there is a positive attitude to having children. We quote from Genesis 
1,28: “be fruitful and multiply”. This suggests that the attitude of individuals with respect to family 
size may vary with the degree of religiosity. Therefore we do not only include the variable family 
size but its interaction with the variable RELIGIOSITY as well. This interaction variable may be 
                                                 
3 For a more sophisticated approach to this problem see Van Praag, Frijters, and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003).  
4 This incongruity is a bit unfortunate, but the present authors were not involved in creating the questionnaire.   10
interpreted in two ways. First, it opens room for the possibility that religious people evaluate having 
children differently than secular persons do. Second, it may be that individuals with children are 
evaluating being religious differently. For instance, in religious communities parents of many 
children are in higher esteem than couples without children.   
It might also be surmised that every individual chooses its own religion and the degree of religiosity. 
In that case everybody would choose its optimal level and measuring the causal effect of religiosity 
on happiness would be hopeless. However, from data collected for another year, where parental 
religiosity was asked as well, we know that there is a strong correlation between religiosity between 
generations, both for Jews and Muslims. The fact that the individual’s religiosity is strongly and 
positively correlated with parental religiosity reveals that the choice of living religiously or not is for 
many respondents more based on parental tradition than on a deliberate choice. Therefore, religiosity 
is very much pre-determined by parental upbringing.  
 
 
Immigrant status and ethnicity 
Israel is one of the countries with the highest fraction of immigrants in the world. These are for the 
most part Jewish immigrants, who have come from ‘the four corners of the world’. The Israeli Social 
Survey, on which this research is based, does not cover temporary workers or non-permanent 
residents. Hence, for example, Palestinian commuters and Asian service personnel have been 
excluded.  
We conjecture that immigrants adapt their norms on happiness over time to those of the natives and 
that the memory of their original worse situation wears out, the longer ago they have immigrated. In 
addition, it is well known that immigrants mostly have a hard time after arrival, as they lack fluency 
in Hebrew,  and other skills needed; moreover, their social network tends to be much weaker than 
that of natives. Therefore we include a variable ln(years since immigration/age)  that indicates what 
part of their life immigrants have already lived in Israel. For instance, an immigrant of 50 years old 
who is living for 20 years in the country scores a value of ln(20/50) on that (negative) variable. We 
name the variable  'YEARS IN ISRAEL' for short. The variable equals zero for natives. We notice 
that we neglect the fact that there is also a slight non-Jewish immigration.    11
Finally, we include fluency in Hebrew, the country's official language, as an explanatory variable, as 
this is a key to social inclusion and economic progress, not only for Jewish immigrants, but for the 
Arab minority as well.  
We already said that immigrants were and are still coming from all over the world. Therefore, the 
Jewish population of Israel is not homogeneous at all. Their social status is unequal (see Rubinstein 
and Brenner (2009)). We will differentiate between Sephardi Jews, nearly all originating from North 
Africa or Asia (Asian republics of the FSU excluded), Askenazi Jews coming from Europe,  from 
North-  and Latin- America or from Australia (European republics of the FSU excluded), and Jews 
from the former Soviet Union (FSU). Moreover, we are able to differentiate between first- and 
second generation Israelis, according to where the father was born. We may assume that second-




Unfortunately, Israel has been frequently subjected in recent history to an open war situation, at least 
in some Northern and Southern regions. This was also the case in 2006. In order to estimate the 
effect of such situations, we analyzed the 2006 sample, by dating the interviews with regard to the 
Lebanon War period (July 12 to August 14, 2006). We compare the responses during the war and in 
the after-war period (August 15, to the end of 2006, including the period of 48 days from the 
ceasefire to the completion of the pull-out of Israeli troops from Lebanon) to the responses before 
the war (January 1 to July 11). Therefore we include the logarithm of the war days at the time of the 
interview and its square. We take the log because we assume a habituation effect the longer the war 
is lasting. We admit for  a log-quadratic effect as sentiments may accrue to a maximum and ebb off 
thereafter or inversely. For the same reason we admit for such a log-quadratic effect for the period 
after the ceasefire.  We do this both for life and for financial satisfaction. We assumed a parabola-
like effect, decreasing at first and increasing later on for the Jewish population, and the inverted U -
shape for the Arab population. We also include geographical dummies for the two northern regions, 
hardest and second-hardest hit by Hezbollah during the war. 
Again it is not a priori clear whether the war situation will have a negative or positive effect on life 
and financial satisfaction. With respect to life satisfaction we have to be aware that, notwithstanding 
the physical and mental hardship during wartime, there may grow a very intense feeling of   12
solidarity, patriotism, and togetherness in the population. It is also possible that the Israeli population 
is so accustomed to war, terror and a collective feeling of being threatened, that individuals have 
become immune for it and accept it as a matter of daily life.    
Inside or beyond the Green Line 
Since the 1967 war, the factual situation of East Jerusalem, West Bank (former Jordan territory), and 
Golan Heights (former Syrian territory) has become confused, as Israel created new settlements 
beyond the Green Line, the former boundary between Israel and Jordan and Syria before 1967. The 
Jewish inhabitants number now several hundred thousands. Many of them are strongly religious and 
Zionist-motivated. In the last years there is a heated debate within and outside Israel about the 
legitimacy of these settlements. We include a dummy ‘SETTLEMENTS’ for ‘living beyond the 
Green line’.  
 
3. Description of the data  
 
Our research is based on Israel’s annual Social Survey for the year 2006, which is administered by 
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics. The survey population is defined as the permanent non-
institutional population of citizens, aged 20 and older, including residents of non-custodial 
institutions (such as student dormitories, immigrant centers and independent living projects for the 
elderly). New immigrants are a part of the survey population if they have been present in Israel for at 
least six months. 
The survey is carried out by means of computer-assisted personal interviews with an annual sample 
of about 7,500 people aged 20 and older, which is representative for the survey population of 4.5 
million, including settlements beyond the Green Line. The interviews are conducted in Hebrew, 
Arabic and Russian. On average, interviewing takes 45-50 minutes and includes the core 
questionnaire of 100 items, gathering personal information of the respondent’s household members 
and inquiring on living conditions, the individual’s religion and degree of religiosity, employment 
status, household economic situation, skills and human capital, relations with family and friends, 
volunteering, victimization and, finally, subjective attitudes and satisfaction with various aspects of 
life, such as health, housing, social environment, financial situation and well-being in general. In 
addition, the 2006- survey includes 250-300 items of in-depth inquiry in special annual issues. Here 
we only use the Social Survey core questionnaire.     13
Israel’s Social Survey is conducted throughout the year, five days a week, excluding Jewish calendar 
weekends at Friday and Saturday. This feature allows us to pinpoint an immediate effect of the 
Lebanon War that broke out on July 12, 2006 and lasted for 34 days, and its aftermath till the end of 
the year 2006. During the war there was no interviewing in the areas hit (variables WARZONE1 and 
WARZONE2), while in the rest of Israel the survey was being conducted at its usual pace.  
Now we present some basic descriptive statistics of Israelis in the context of our research. To begin 
with, about 84% of the respondents in our sample are 'satisfied' or 'satisfied very much' with their 
lives; the percentage is significantly higher in the Jewish population than in the Arab population 
(86% and 78% respectively). Satisfaction with the financial situation scores only 53%, being also 
considerably higher among the Jews than among the Arabs (56% and 42% respectively) – see Figure 
1.  
 
Figure 1 insert here 
 
As we mentioned before, we expect religiosity to be associated with a higher fertility. This is 
evidently true for the Jewish population, but not for the Arab population (see Table 2). The latter 
phenomenon might be due to the fact that among the Muslims and the Christians religiosity on the 
average increases while growing older, which is not the case for the Jewish population.  
 
HERE TABLE 2 
 
Table 3 presents the distribution of Jews in the Social Survey population by ethnic origin. Almost 
43% of Jews aged 20 and above were born abroad, whereas the fathers of another 39% were 
immigrants. Only 18% of the Jewish population aged 20 and above are at least third generation in 
Israel. Among Jews who are the first or the second generation in Israel, one-quarter are from the 
Former Soviet Union, 30% are of Ashkenazi descent, while the rest are of Sephardic descent.  
 
HERE TABLE 3 
  
4. Results 
   14
As stated before, we consider two dependent variables, viz., life satisfaction and satisfaction with 
one’s financial situation. The estimates for life satisfaction and financial satisfaction are presented in 
Table 4a and 4b for Jews and Arabs, respectively  
When comparing the tables we should keep in mind that the net size of the Arab sub-sample is about 
1100, while the Jewish sub-sample consists of about 5100 respondents. It implies that we may 
expect that the ‘Arab’ standard deviations will be about twice as large ( 51
11) as the ‘Jewish‘ 




We experimented with three specifications. The effect of age is threefold. Apart from its own effect, 
there is a strong connection between family size and age, as up to a certain age older people usually 
have more children at home than younger people. There is also a strong correlation between age and 
health, since health generally decreases with age. If we leave health out, we may expect that the age-
effects become more pronounced. Comparing the full specification A and specification C, without 
the health variable, we see that the exclusion of HEALTH leads indeed to the predicted effect that 
the other age-related coefficients become more pronounced, while the other effects do not 
significantly change. We notice that this holds as well for the financial satisfaction equation. It is 
found both for Jews and Arabs.  As Health is very significant in specification A, we choose for 
inclusion of Health in the final specification.  
A second problem is the inclusion of ln(family size). That family size is a determinant of life 
satisfaction and financial satisfaction is well-known (cf. Van Praag and Warnaar, 1993). However, is 
this effect the same for religious and non-religious individuals? The best way to get an answer is to 
add to the variable ln(family size) an interaction variable ln(family size)*RELIGIOSITY. We 
estimated the equation with and without this variable (spec. A and B, respectively). For the Jewish 
sample it turns out that the interaction variable is significant, even pushing aside the effect of the 
original variable RELIGIOSITY itself, while the effect of ln(family size), when comparing 
specification A to B, remains intact. Our conclusion is that the effect of religiosity on life and on 
financial satisfaction for Jews is tied up with having children and that the effect of having children 
differs with the degree of religiosity.  For the Arab population this effect is not found.   15
The same model that we used for explaining life satisfaction we use for explaining the satisfaction 
with the individual’s financial situation. We generally find the same signs. This sign correspondence 
is not strange, for financial satisfaction is an important component of life satisfaction, as was shown 
in Van Praag, Frijters, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003). However, most of the effects are found to be more 
pronounced for the evaluation of the financial situation than for life satisfaction. This is intuitively 
plausible as life satisfaction has a much wider coverage than asking for satisfaction with respect to  
the financial domain only. These quantitative differences are large enough to imply that financial 
satisfaction is not identical at all with life satisfaction. In the older economic literature and in a 
considerable part still nowadays it is tacitly assumed that there is an identity between the utility of 
income and life satisfaction. If we assume that the empirically observed financial satisfaction may be 
identified with the traditional theoretical concept of the utility of money, then this empirical 
observation is strong evidence that utility of income and life satisfaction are different things. For 
economic theory, and especially the study of inequalities and theories involving utility 
maximization, this has rather strong implications. We notice that this still holds when we abstain 
from any cardinal interpretations. The two satisfaction concepts have rather different nets of 
indifference curves. 
 
The Jewish subsample 
 
HERE TABLE 4 
 
Let us first look at the results for the Jewish sub-sample. As usual when estimating happiness 
equations we find  sizeable income effects. For life satisfaction as a whole we find 0.159 and for 
financial satisfaction we have 0.553. That income is much more relevant for the financial domain 
than for life as a whole is evident and to be expected. The quadratic age effect is in line with the 
literature, being significantly parabolic. The minimum lies at about 44 years of age for life 
satisfaction and at about 40 for financial satisfaction. 
As we already surmised before, the variable RELIGIOSITY and family size are intertwined. This 
result is fairly surprising, as it actually implies that children are negative factors for life satisfaction 
for irreligious persons, while they have a positive effect on the life satisfaction of religious people.   16
More precisely, as RELIGIOSITY for Jews takes the values -0.88, 0.19, 0.72, 1.19, 1.91 from 
secular to ultra-orthodox, the family effect ranges from -0.034+0.081*(-0.88) = (-0.034 -0.072) = -
0.106  to + 0.102 for ultra-orthodox
5. It implies that secular families are less happy than orthodox 
families with an equal number of children. Restricting ourselves to financial satisfaction the same 
calculations give the range -0.270 + 0.065*(-0.88)= -0.327 to -0.146. Again, as life satisfaction has 
to be seen as an aggregate of domain satisfactions, the fact that the family effect on life satisfaction 
is much smaller than on financial satisfaction reflects the fact that the financial costs of children are 
partly compensated by the pleasures children give in the non-financial domains. However, the fact 
remains that for the totally non-religious having children seems to diminish life satisfaction. Solving 
the equation -0.034+0.081*(RELIGIOSITY)=0, we find RELIGIOSITY = 0.42 to be the degree of 
religiosity, where one is indifferent for having more or less children. The value 0.42  corresponds on 
the ‘Jewish’ religiosity scale (see Table 1a) with the border line between ‘’ traditional not so 
religious’ and ‘traditional–religious’. Needless to say that there are many more determinants for 
fertility behavior than religion alone. Nevertheless, the relatively small families of non-religious 
Jewish individuals are herewith partially explained. 
 
From these equations we can also derive estimated subjective family equivalence scales (see Van 
Praag, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004), Van Praag,Warnaar (1993)). Let us consider, for instance, by 
which fraction household income y has to be increased to compensate for an addition in family size 
of  ln( ) fs Δ . The compensation is called just if financial satisfaction is kept constant. Assuming for 
simplicity RELIGIOSITY = 0, we have to solve the equation  
  0.55 (ln ) 0.27 (ln ) 0 yf s Δ −Δ =  
For an addition from 2 to 3 children this implies that compensated income  com y  satisfies 
 
0.27
ln( / ) ln(5/ 4)
0.55




0.55 (5/ 4) . 1.15. com y yy ==  
Hence a five-person family counts for 1.15 times a four-person family. 
                                                 
5 In these calculations we ignore the non-significance of some estimates.   17
When we would differentiate with respect to religiosity the exponent for secular Jews would be 
0.33/0.55 = 0.6, while for the ultra-orthodox Jews we would have 0.145. This suggests that family 
equivalence scales might be differentiated according to religiosity. 
 
As frequently found, health status has a great impact on life satisfaction (see also Clark and Oswald, 
1994).  The effect of health on financial satisfaction is considerable as well but smaller than for life 
as a whole.  
Schooling at the BA level has only very weak statistical significance. For Jews we find a moderate 
positive effect for schooling at the MA-level. The difference between employed and unemployed is 
rather strong. Surprisingly, the employment status scores less than the reference situation of those 
out of the labor market. This part of the population consists, among others, of students and full-time 
religious scholars and retired. Overall participation rates in Israel are significantly lower than in most 
OECD countries.  
The marriage status is a significant source of happiness. The divorced are much less happy, while the 
widow and widower score in between, where ‘unmarried’ is the reference situation.  
 
Immigrant status 
With respect to immigration we see that all first generation immigrants are less happy than their 
compatriots. However, the second generation effects are all insignificant, implying that the second 
generation is well integrated into Israeli society.  
We tried various specifications for the immigrant's assimilation process. As said before ‘Years in 
Israel’ is our natural hunch, as individuals get more integrated, the longer they are in the country. 
However, whether this effect is monotonic or not is doubtful, because many new immigrants are 
rather elated at first, but are faced with integration difficulties later on. Moreover, it is obvious that 
our differentiation between first-generation and second-generation immigrants catches already a part 
of the adaptation effect over time. Isolating the effect is also hampered by the inclusion of the 
variable ‘fluency in Hebrew’, which is evidently strongly correlated with the length of the stay in 
Israel.  Finally, we ended with the specification ‘Years in Israel’ = ln( / ) x age , where x stands for the 
absolute number of years in Israel, age stands for the respondent’s age, and where the log-transform 
stretches the variable over the real axis. The effect of ‘years in Israel’ is significant for financial   18
satisfaction, but not for life satisfaction. Hebrew fluency has a strong positive effect, as expected, but 
more for life as a whole than for the financial situation.  
The war effects on life satisfaction in the latter half of 2006 are mostly  statistically insignificant. 
Nevertheless, it does not imply that the estimates are necessarily meaningless, but only that the 
sample size is insufficient to get significance. For life satisfaction we find a low for the Jewish 
population after about 3 days after the beginning of hostilities. After ceasefire we find a top at about 
6.5 days. For financial satisfaction we find (surprisingly) a high at about day 20 after outbreak of the 
war and a low after ceasefire at about day 9. For financial satisfaction we find a significant log-
parabolic effect for after war days with a top at about 10 days after the war. Then the effect peters 
out. Finally the settlers seem to be much happier, both in general and with respect to their financial 




We consider now the same equations for the Arab population. We do not repeat observations, 
already made for the Jewish results. The Arab estimates are about half as significant as for the 
Jewish sample, but this is due to the much smaller sample size, as we already predicted. Actually, 
some of the coefficients are non-significantly different from zero in the Arab sub-sample, while in 
the Jewish sub-sample they are significant. However, even for the non-significant coefficients we 
can see whether the estimates for Jews and Arabs are significantly different
6.  
As already noticed before, the role of children in Arab families seems to differ from their role in 
Jewish families. Their role as happiness determinant is not linked to religion. Also the (negative) 
impact on financial satisfaction does not differ between religious and secular people.  
Jews seem to value the marital status somewhat higher than Arabs do. On the contrary, widowhood 
seems to be a better status in the Arab family than in the Jewish family. The jobless status seems to 
be less negatively evaluated among Arabs than among Jews. This may be caused by the higher 
official unemployment in the Arab population, reducing the stigma on unemployment. Another 
possible explanation of this finding is related to the fact that wages of Arabs are at average much 
lower than wages of Jews, whereas the compensation rates of the unemployment benefits in Israel 
                                                 
6 By looking at the difference, divided by the square root of the sum of the variances.   19
are declining with income. That is, income loss of an average Arab unemployed is much smaller 
than of a Jewish unemployed citizen.  
 It is tempting to consider the impact of the Lebanon war on both populations. Intuition predicts that 
the feelings of both populations will be the opposite. Although the statistical significance of the 
relevant estimates is low, we see that the effects for the Arab population are much larger than for the  
Jewish population. For life satisfaction we find indeed opposite signs, although non-significant, but 
for financial satisfaction we do not. We see that the Arabic population was strongly affected during 
the war days and not after the war ceased. For the Jewish population it was inverse. Very much 
tongue in cheek during the war and significantly moved when the war ceased. 
The age effects are about similar. As already said the effect of log–age is parabolic, where happiness 
falls until a certain age, say the ‘dip-age‘, and rises after. Although the differences are not 
statistically different, the dip-age for the Jewish population lies at about 44 and for Arabs at about 
35. This finding is found for the other specifications as well. It may have to do with a lower life 
expectancy for the Arab population
7, but the data set is too small to draw significant conclusions. 
Finally, we see a marked difference between Arab Muslims and Christians. Christians are happier 
than Muslims, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
Like in the case of life satisfaction, employees seem to be less satisfied with their financial situation 
than individuals out of the labor force (retirees, beneficiaries) For Arab families the impact of 
children does not vary with RELIGIOSITY as for Jewish families. The effect of children on 
financial satisfaction is strongly negative.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion. 
 
In this paper we analyzed happiness in Israel. As such it is the second study, after Romanov et al. 
(2010) who focused mostly on the effect of terror attacks during the three years of Intifada (2002-
2004), on life-satisfaction of Israelis. Partly, it replicates the now more or less traditional results, 
well known from the exponentially expanding literature in happiness economics. However, there are 
some new features in the data set that we exploited. First, we used the fact that the Israeli population 
                                                 
7 The life expectancy of Arabs is almost five years shorter than the life expectancy of the Jews.   20
is divided into two main ethnic sub–populations, viz. Jews and Arabs. The ethnic gap coincides with 
a religious gap between Jewish majority and Muslim and Christian minorities; hence,  we cannot 
well ascribe the differences found to ethnic differences or to religious differences. Within all sub-
populations we were able to find fine differentiations in religiosity. We saw that on the whole 
Muslims are less satisfied with their life than Christians, while Jews score the highest; this may have 
to do with the status of majority and minority as well. For both groups we find strong children 
effects, which are mostly negative. However within the Jewish community religious people evaluate 
having children differently than non–religious people. Children are less of a burden (or even a 
blessing) for religious Jews than for secular Jews.  For the Arab population we do not find such a 
relation between family size and religiosity.  
The second rather unique feature of Israel’s society is that a sizeable part of the Jewish population 
consists of immigrants. We see that all first-generation immigrants are less happy than their native 
compatriots, but that in the second generation there is no statistically significant difference. It is also 
found that there is no significant difference between the Sephardis, Ashkenazis and immigrants from 
the former USSR, when we control for other factors. Albeit to a much smaller extent, the present 
immigration influx into Europe may be compared with the Israeli immigration history. Then our 
Israeli observations may be cause for some optimism with respect to the integration of immigrants in 
Europe. 
Finally, we investigated the effect of the 2006 military conflict between Israel and Hezbollah on life 
and financial satisfaction. We found a positive effect for Arabs that petered out during the hostilities 
and no effect afterwards. For the Jewish population the effects were the opposite. Not much effect 
during the war, but a temporary positive effect after the end of the hostilities. We should take into 
account that the explanatory variable is the number of days during the war and after. Much better, 
but not available, would have been a kind of index variable reflecting the chances of the war in favor 
of or against Israel. The chances varied considerably during the period of open war, and also after 
the end of the hostilities. That may explain the large standard errors of the estimates, as reporting in 
the survey fluctuated daily with ups and downs of national mood and military fortunes and 
misfortunes.   
It might be surmised that religion has an effect on life satisfaction but not on the narrower concept of 
financial satisfaction. It turns out that this is not true.   21
From these first results, that should be replicated for other non-western societies before generalizing,  
it can be derived that religion is an important and probably underestimated factor in the explanation 
of happiness. This suggests that for the evaluation and explanation of subjective income and well-
being inequalities (cf. Ferrer -i-Carbonell, Van Praag (2003)) we should take differences in religion 
and in religiosity into account. Hebrew fluency seems very important for life quality both for Jews 
and Arabs, but much less so for financial satisfaction.  
The results of this paper moreover show that the happiness economics methodology is perfectly 
applicable on non-Western societies. It would be attractive to perform a similar analysis for more 
countries in the Middle East. 
   22
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Table 1a. Distribution of religiosity, by ethnic group  
Response categories  Jews  Response categories  Arabs (Muslim, 
Christian, Druze, 
Other) 
Do you consider 






Do you consider 






Non-religious, secular or 
atheist -0.8808  0.374 
Non-religious  -1.2609 0.043 
Traditional not so 
religious 0.1857  0.205  Not so religious  -0.3118  0.042 
Traditional-religious 0.7245  0.113 Religious  0.6426  0.073 
Religious  1.1910 0.081  Very religious  1.9818 0.010 
Ultra-orthodox 1.9148  0.059      
 
 
Table 1b. Distribution of health status, by ethnic group 
Response categories  Jews  Arabs 
(Muslim, Christian, Druze, Other) 
  POLS values  Fraction of 
total sample 
POLS values  Fraction of 
total sample 
Health is not good at all  -1.9590  0.053  -1.8439  0.014 
Health is not so good  -1.1168  0.121  -0.9990  0.027 
Health is good  -0.2875  0.302  -0.2800  0.050 
Health is very good  0.9177  0.356  0.8637 0.077 
 
 
Table 2. Family size and average age, by ethnic group, religion and religious intensity 
Jews Arabs 
   Muslim  Christian  Druze and 
Other 
  Family 
size  Age   Family 
size  Age  Family 
size  Age  Family 




3.00 46.4  Non-
religious  5.22 35.2  3.72 43.5  4.57 34.0 
Traditional not 
so religious  3.28 47.8  Not so 
religious  5.24 34.7  3.66 42.6  4.27 38.1 
Traditional-
religious  3.58 48.5  Religious  5.09 42.0  3.56 50.4  4.57 48.6 
Religious 3.91  46.8  Very 
religious  4.88 43.9  2.00 70.0  4.04 55.2 
Ultra-orthodox  5.07  38.4              26
 
Table 3. Distribution of Jews aged 20 and above by origin and generation in Israel 
Origin  First generation in Israel  Second generation in Israel 
Former USSR  0.179  0.026 
Ashkenaz 0.120  0.127 
Sephard 0.129  0.235 
Total 0.428  0.388 
At least third generation in 
Israel 
0.184 
    27
Table 4a.  Life satisfaction and financial  satisfaction for Jews in Israel, 2006 
 
  Life satisfaction  Financial  satisfaction 
  (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept  11.392* 11.004* 12.034* 12.330* 12.024* 12.800* 
  (1.404) (1.402) (1.458) (1.424) (1.421) (1.449) 
Ln(income)  0.159* 0.150* 0.217* 0.553* 0.545* 0.593* 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Ln(age)  -6.898* -6.654* -7.232* -9.409* -9.215* -9.653* 
  (0.769) (0.767) (0.798) (0.779) (0.777) (0.793) 
{Ln(age)}
2  0.911* 0.880* 0.914* 1.282* 1.258* 1.286* 
  (0.103) (0.103) (0.107) (0.105) (0.104) (0.107) 
Ln(family  size)  -0.034  -0.021 -0.057* -0.270* -0.260* -0.286* 
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Ln(family size) 
*RELIGIOSITY  0.081*    0.117* 0.065*   0.091* 
  (0.022)    (0.023) (0.022)   (0.023) 
RELIGIOSITY  0.016 0.113* -0.017  0.033 0.111*  0.010 
  (0.030) (0.014) (0.031) (0.030) (0.015) (0.031) 
Health  0.331* 0.336*    0.229* 0.233*   
  (0.016) (0.016)    (0.017) (0.017)   
Schooling  BA  max  -0.014  -0.011 0.016 0.005 0.007 0.026 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
Schooling  MA  min  0.057* 0.061* 0.090* 0.081* 0.085* 0.104* 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Married  0.297* 0.282* 0.321* 0.151* 0.140* 0.168* 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) 
Divorced  -0.020 -0.030 -0.030 -0.080 -0.087 -0.087 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) 
Widow(er)  0.059 0.042 0.060 0.068 0.055 0.069 
  (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) 
Former  USSR  1gen  -0.057  -0.058 -0.171* -0.184* -0.186* -0.263* 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) 
Former  USSR  2gen  0.034 0.044 0.002  -0.009 0.000  -0.030 
  (0.074) (0.074) (0.077) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) 
Ashkenaz 1gen  -0.087  -0.084  -0.125* -0.098* -0.096* -0.124* 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) 
Ashkenaz  2  gen  0.039 0.038 0.043 0.046 0.045 0.048 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
Sephard  1gen  -0.102* -0.117* -0.164* -0.057 -0.069  -0.100* 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) 
Sephard  2  gen  -0.034  -0.038  -0.057 0.016 0.013 0.000 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) 
Years  in  Israel  -0.003  -0.003  -0.048 -0.102* -0.102* -0.132* 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Hebrew  fluency  0.098* 0.100* 0.184*  0.030  0.031 0.089* 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Employed  -0.099* -0.103*  -0.021 -0.164* -0.167* -0.109* 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Unemployed  -0.305* -0.312* -0.270* -0.370* -0.375* -0.345*   28
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) 
Warzone1  0.050 0.053 0.041 0.012 0.014 0.006 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Warzone2  0.028 0.027 0.029 0.036 0.035 0.036 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
Ln(war  days)  -0.095  -0.101  -0.124 0.058 0.053 0.039 
  (0.096) (0.097) (0.100) (0.098) (0.098) (0.100) 
{Ln(war days)}
2  0.048  0.050  0.054 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Ln(after  war  days)  0.012  0.014  0.024 0.086* 0.087* 0.094* 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
{Ln(after war days)}
2  -0.003  -0.004  -0.007 -0.019* -0.019* -0.021* 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Settlement  0.137* 0.148* 0.135* 0.108* 0.117* 0.106* 
  (0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) 
No.  obs.  5114 5114 5116 5128 5128 5130 
Adjusted R
2  0.2527 0.2509 0.1934 0.2684 0.2673 0.2413 
 
Standard deviations in parentheses. * significance at 0.05-level. Regressions weighted by the sample weights.    29
 
Table4b.  Life satisfaction and financial  satisfaction for Arabs in Israel, 2006 
 
  Life satisfaction  Financial  satisfaction 
  (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
Intercept  6.534* 6.065* 5.915* 8.703* 9.238* 8.312* 
  (2.940) (2.908) (3.103) (2.931) (2.900) (2.997) 
Ln(income)  0.148* 0.150* 0.182* 0.583* 0.581* 0.605* 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) 
Ln(age)  -4.596* -4.335* -3.945* -7.600* -7.898* -7.188* 
  (1.611) (1.593) (1.700) (1.607) (1.589) (1.642) 
{Ln(age)}
2  0.646* 0.609* 0.486* 1.039* 1.081* 0.938* 
  (0.220) (0.217) (0.231) (0.219) (0.216) (0.223) 
Ln(family  size)  -0.082  -0.085  -0.058 -0.225* -0.223* -0.210* 
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) 
Ln(family size) 
*RELIGIOSITY  0.061   0.058  -0.070   -0.072 
  (0.057)   (0.060)  (0.057)   (0.058) 
RELIGIOSITY  0.033 0.126*  0.039 0.217* 0.111* 0.220* 
  (0.092) (0.032) (0.097) (0.092) (0.032) (0.094) 
Health  0.373* 0.372*    0.236* 0.237*   
  (0.033) (0.033)    (0.033) (0.033)   
Schooling  BA  max  0.038 0.042 0.045 0.137 0.133 0.141 
  (0.081) (0.081) (0.086) (0.081) (0.081) (0.083) 
Schooling  MA  min  0.019 0.022 0.081 0.113 0.109 0.152 
  (0.091) (0.091) (0.096) (0.091) (0.091) (0.093) 
Married  0.121  0.121 0.233* 0.171* 0.171* 0.242* 
  (0.082) (0.082) (0.086) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) 
Divorced  -0.007 0.018 0.132 0.150 0.123 0.238 
  (0.208) (0.207) (0.219) (0.207) (0.206) (0.212) 
Widow(er)  0.266  0.265 0.396* 0.407* 0.408* 0.490* 
  (0.166) (0.166) (0.175) (0.165) (0.165) (0.168) 
Hebrew  fluency  0.074* 0.074* 0.122* 0.079* 0.078* 0.109* 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Employed  -0.149* -0.153*  -0.067 -0.217* -0.212* -0.165* 
  (0.064) (0.064) (0.067) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) 
Unemployed  -0.061  -0.063  0.002 -0.307* -0.305* -0.268* 
  (0.118) (0.118) (0.124) (0.118) (0.118) (0.120) 
Warzone1  -0.017 -0.020 -0.019 -0.091 -0.087 -0.092 
  (0.081) (0.081) (0.085) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) 
Warzone2  0.145* 0.140* 0.119* -0.029 -0.023 -0.045 
  (0.059) (0.059) (0.063) (0.059) (0.059) (0.061) 
Ln(war  days)  0.438  0.441  0.429 0.792* 0.789* 0.786* 
  (0.339) (0.339) (0.358) (0.338) (0.338) (0.346) 
{Ln(war days)}
2  -0.137  -0.138  -0.140 -0.253* -0.253* -0.255* 
  (0.118) (0.118) (0.124) (0.117) (0.117) (0.120) 
Ln(after  war  days)  -0.071 -0.069 -0.112  0.011  0.008 -0.015 
  (0.070) (0.070) (0.074) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) 
{Ln(after war days)}
2  0.026 0.025 0.029 0.011 0.011 0.013 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)   30
Christian  0.153* 0.162*  0.100 -0.091 -0.102 -0.125 
  (0.079) (0.078) (0.083) (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) 
Druze  0.465* 0.468* 0.436* 0.264* 0.261* 0.246* 
  (0.088) (0.088) (0.093) (0.088) (0.088) (0.090) 
No.  obs.  1104 1104  1104  1105 1105 1105 
Adjusted R
2  0.1703 0.1702  0.075 0.2198 0.2194 0.1842 
 
Standard deviations in parentheses. * significance at 0.05-level. Regressions weighted by the sample weights.    31
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